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THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF ETHICS-FEAR AND LEARNING IN THE 
PROFESSION 
John M. Levy* 
A token course on ethics might be worse than none, for it 
may create an illusion pregnant with mischief. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with one small, though important, part 
of the professional disciplinary system-the duty of judges to 
report unprofessional conduct of which they become aware.1 
The genesis of this article was my work as a clinical law 
teacher simultaneously observing the academic and the practi-
cal parts of the profession. As a law teacher working with stu-
dents in their early experiences with the practice of law, I 
have been struck by what appears to be a lack of ethical sensi-
tivity-awareness of problems of professional responsibility.8 
For example, when students are interviewing clients, analyz-
ing problems, and exploring various alternatives open to the 
clients, they often fail to spot the ethical questions that arise.' 
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1. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295, 
296 (1980). 
2. "A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a 
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware." 
ABA CoDE OF JuDiciAL CoNDUCT CANON No. 3B(3) (1980). 
The requirement in Canon 11 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the predecessor 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, was similar. "A judge should utilize his opportunities 
to criticise and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counsellors, brought 
to his attention; and if adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the 
matter at once to the proper investigating and disciplinary authorities." ABA CANONS 
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 11. 
3. "[W]e observe that issues about the lawyer's role, his ethics, and his compe-
tence are largely unnoticed or ignored in approaching and solving a client's problem." 
T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 118 (1977). 
4. It is possible that the students do "spot" the ethical questions but fail to 
95 
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Yet, these same students in the same interviews usually are 
able to spot and articulate most legal issues with alacrity. As 
most students have had courses in both the substantive law 
and professional ethics, it piqued my curiosity as to why the 
legal issues were spotted and articulated while the ethical is-
sues were apparently neither spotted nor articulated. 
The other impetus for the ideas suggested here came 
from a specific incident that arose in working with a student 
on a case. We were handling a case in which we believed there 
had been a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity by another lawyer. As a result, we were obligated to file a 
complaint11 with the Virginia State Bar.6 The lawyer had with-
held the decree of divorce from a woman because she had not 
paid all of the lawyer's fee. The Virginia State Bar has previ-
ously found to be improper the similar practice of a lawyer's 
refusal to obtain the divorce decree because the lawyer's fee 
had not been paid. 7 The student did some additional research 
on the question before we ultimately made the decision to file 
the complaint. In his research the student came upon the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court case of Moore v. Moore. 8 In the state-
ment of the facts was the following sentence: "Counsel denied 
that he had failed to communicate with his adversary, assert-
ing that during the previous October he had notified the hus-
band's attorney that he would not seek entry of a final decree 
because his attorney's fee had not been paid by the wife."9 
The court did not say anything about what appears to be a 
prima facie case of a violation of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.10 This posed a dilemma. Here was the highest ar-
biter of Virginia lawyers' ethics setting out in a published 
opinion an admission of an apparent ethical violation by an 
articulate them. It is, however, difficult to determine whether that is the case, and in 
either event, it is doubtful that that question is particularly relevant to the ethical 
problems of the profession. 
5. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 1-
103(A)(1976)(duty to file). 
6. The Virginia disciplinary system is found in VA. CODE §§ 54-74 (1980). See 
also Green v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Va. 1976)(a descrip-
tion of the system in use). 
7. VIRGINIA STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, INFORMAL LEGAL ETHICS OPIN-
IONS Nos. 62 and 445 (January 1975). See also ABA CoMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINION No. 1455 (June 1980). 
8. 218 Va. 790, 240 S.E.2d 535 (1978). 
9. ld. at 792, 240 S.E.2d at 536. 
10. See note 7 supra. 
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attorney, yet there was not even a comment by the court on 
the possibility that the conduct described might be prohib-
ited. Did this indicate that in the court's view such action was 
permissible, no matter what the Ethics Committee of the 
State Bar might say? If such was the case, it made no sense to 
make the complaint, and it might even be considered mali-
cious or wrong to do so. Further research made it apparent 
that courts rarely comment on what appears to be clear ethi-
cal violations set out in their description of lawyer's actions in 
the cases they were deciding. 11 Therefore, we concluded that 
the absence of a statement in Moore did not indicate the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's position on the ethical violation which 
it had set out in the facts of the case. A complaint was made 
to the disciplinary committee of the Virginia State Bar. 12 Our 
resolve, however, was sorely tested by the court's opinion in 
Moore. 
It is the premise of this article that there is a connection 
between the fact that law students do not identify and articu-
late ethical questions when they are presented with them in 
actual practice situations and the fact that courts, especially 
appellate courts, do not discuss ethical violations presented by 
the cases before them. Courts, therefore, have a significant 
role to play in both the enforcement and teaching (fear and 
learning) of the ethical responsibilities of lawyers. Appellate 
courts in their written opinions must, sua sponte, set out any 
serious ethical question which the record or the conduct of the 
lawyers brings to their attention and, moreover, state that the 
question is being referred to the appropriate agency for 
investigation. 
This article will set out two separate but complementary 
justifications for this proposition. First, that such action by 
courts is essential for the teaching of ethics in law school. Sec-
ond, that action is equally essential for the effective operation 
of the disciplinary system. 
11. See, e.g., Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980). 
12. The action complained of was subsequently found not to have been a viola· 
tion. VIRGINIA STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, INFORMAL LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 
No. 450 (1975). The Committee, however, was not unanimous. Letter to author from 
Committee Chairman on file. 
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II. THE RoLE OF CouRTs IN TEACHING (LEARNING) ETHics 
The teaching of professional ethics, like other subjects in 
law school, had traditionally been segregated in a separate 
course.18 We in effect told students, "Now you will think and 
learn about Torts. Now stop. Now you will think and learn 
about Ethics. Now stop." The limitations and distortions from 
this type of teaching and learning are clear.14 For quite some 
years the "pervasive approach" to the teaching of ethics has 
been advocated111 and probably adopted by most law schools 
and law professors. That approach "requires that . . . the 
faculty take special care to point out and discuss in their reg-
ular courses various latent professional responsibility issues 
.... [T]he aim is to lead the student to recognize profes-
sional responsibility issues that are suggested by cases in the 
casebook .... "16 If one of the objects of legal education is to 
"sensitize the student to professional responsibility issues-to 
enable him to recognize and be concerned about them,"17 in 
addition to having students memorize a set of rules, 16 clearly 
then that task must "pervade" legal education. The question 
then presents itself: How can the teaching of ethics in law 
school be "pervasive" in any meaningful way when what law 
students spend the huge bulk of their time reading, thinking 
about, discussing and truly making a part of him or her-
13. M. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 23-29 (1980)(history of 
teaching ethics in law school). 
14. "We cannot expect too much from ethics classes held, like church services, a 
couple of hours a week." Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 452, 454 n.16 (1972)(quoting Weckstein, Boulder II: Why and How, 41 U. CoLO. 
L. REv. 304, 308-09 (1969)). See also T. SHAFFER AND R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAw 
STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977); Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Re-
sponsibility: A Curricular Paradox, A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 247 (1979). 
15. Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale-"The Vanderbilt Ex-
periment," 15 J. LEGAL EDuc. 435 (1963). It has been pointed out "[t]hat changes in 
the curriculum are the answer to all public deficiencies is, of course, in keeping with 
the great American tradition of painless reform. Everything from the study of Chau-
cer to the pursuit of 'social science' has been proposed to this end." J. SHKLAR, LE-
GALISM 19 (1964). 
16. Smedley, supra note 15, at 437 (emphasis added). 
17. /d. at 436. See also D. CALLAHAN & S. BoK, ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION (1980). "How to stimulate the moral feelings and imagination of students 
... so that an ethics course is not merely 'an abstract intellectual exercise?'" /d. at 
117. 
18. Memorizing the rules will also be more important with the advent of the 
"Ethics Exam" for admission to the Bar. California, Georgia, Kansas, New Hamp-
shire and South Carolina have adopted such an exam. 12 NAT'L BAR J. 1 (1980). 
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self-the appellate opinion-is completely devoid of any dis-
cussion of ethical issues? 
The significance of teaching professional responsibility in 
law school should be more than merely to enlarge the meaning 
of "thinking like a lawyer"19 to include the ability to spot and 
analyze ethical issues. In educating students to be profession-
als, the law school has an impact on how the person will ulti-
mately behave in that role.20 If one accepts the proposition 
that law school can and should have an important part to play 
in the formation of a person's "identity" as a lawyer, then one 
must look closely and analyze the role models for lawyering 
which are provided for law students.21 
In the traditional legal educational setting the student 
will have the law professor as the only live role model for a 
lawyer.22 This is clearly not all bad. The stereotypical image 
of the law professor is of a very bright, articulate, intellectual 
19. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH: ON OuR LAw AND ITS STUDY 
(1951); Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L. 
REV. 735 (1978). 
20. Our society prolongs the period of adolescence to a large extent 
through the intensive and extensive imposed process of education. The 
issue of a person's "identity" is thus kept open for quite a long time. It 
is precisely upon this area of personality function that the important 
lessons of professional behavior should focus .... The universal human 
need to have objects for modeling and identity formation may be the 
single most important psychological factor in the educational pro-
cess . . . . It is critical then that legal educators avoid reinforcement of 
inappropriate lawyer behavior and avidly grasp every opportunity to re-
inforce positively those behaviors which are vital to effective and appro-
priate professional practice. 
Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal 
Education, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON . TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
MATERIALS & PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 631, 633 (P. Keenan, ed. 
1979). 
21. "It is axiomatic that professional ethics are taught by precept and exam-
ple." Hyde, The Duty and Obligations of the Bar for the Maintenance of Profes-
sional Standards, 29 S. CAL. L. Rliv. 81, 82 (1955) (emphasis in original). This san1e 
analysis can be made from a more sociologicttl perspective. In those terms one would 
speak of "socializ[ing) students adequately into the ethical norms of the legal profes-
sion." Pipkin, supra note 14, at 265. 
22. "Because law students only rarely have conceptualized the way in which 
they shall become working lawyer-professionals, the law faculty and other persons 
who teach them how to behave as lawyers become extremely important to such ulti-
mate shaping." Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psy-
chiatric Analysis in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 139, 141 (1973) 
(working papers prepared for the Council on Legal Educ. for Professional Responsi-
bility, Inc,. Nat'! Conference). See generally L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND 
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 829-31 (1969) (discussion of role theory). 
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and all-knowing person.28 However, the law-teaching profes-
sion has successfully separated itself into a category distinct 
from the lawyering profession,24 and to that extent students 
do not see law professors as appropriate role models or men-
tors. There has been some change in the last ten years with 
the advent of clinical programs in most law schools.211 Still, the 
clinical programs are most often in a public interest type of 
practice, and the clinical teacher is frequently seen as an out-
sider in academia-a "do-gooder," not really accepted or ac-
ceptable as an appropriate role model as a professional. 26 
If this analysis is correct as to the difficulty of having the 
law professor as an important role model, then the pervasive 
approach will not ring true to the student. If the teacher 
points out the "latent"27 ethical issues in a case, most stu-
dents will assume that the "ivory tower" academic is again 
playing an analytical game. 28 If this ethical issue were truly 
important in the "real" world of lawyering it would not be 
"latent," but explicit. 
To look at this same point from another perspective, one 
must realize that law students spend far and away the most 
time with the written appellate decision. When law students 
are asked a non-statutory legal question, the thought process 
which they go through is one of retrieving the most analogous 
case or cases from their memory and comparing the facts 
given in the question to what the court said and did. In this 
sense law students and practicing lawyers are legal realists.29 
To the practicing lawyer the law is what the judge before 
whom the case will be heard says it is. To the student the law 
is the "majority opinion" or the state's highest court's written 
23. SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 14, at 157. 
24. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-75 (1976); SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra 
note 14. 
25. COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INc.: SURVEY 
AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION-1978-1979 (1979). 
26. Watson, supra note 20, at 619. 
27. Smedley, supra note 15. 
28. "[l]deas about professional behavior which are picked up from practicing 
lawyers, whatever the character of that behavior may be, will be eagerly grasped and 
emulated by the student, who must learn how to live and practice as a lawyer." Wat-
son, supra note 22, at 142 (emphasis in original). 
29. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897). See 
also W. TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEMENT (1973); J. FRANK, 
LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND (1930); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH: ON OuR LAw 
AND ITS STUDY (1951). 
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opinion. The students' image of both the real world and "the 
law" is built from their study of appellate opinions, the raw 
material of most law school courses. 
Legal education spends considerable time and effort 
teaching and testing "issue spotting." Issue spotting is the lin-
ing up of the elements in a narrative of an everit against a 
legal rule (as derived from and delineated by appellate opin-
ions) and analyzing and articulating where they clearly fit to-
gether, where they clearly do not fit together, and where there 
can be arguments as to whether they do or do not fit. 80 The 
ability to spot issues determines to a large extent a student's 
academic success. In most law school exams the student is 
told that how one resolves the "issue" is not nearly as impor-
tant as spotting it and making the right arguments concerning 
it. 
These two central features of legal education bear directly 
on the ability to teach ethics. 81 The students' image of the 
"real world" of the law is built on the appellate opinion, and 
the students are told that there is great value and great re-
ward82 given to the ability to spot issues. With the importance 
of these two aspects of legal education, assigned appellate 
opinions which are not sensitive to and do not deal explicitly 
with the ethical issues inherent in them create powerful nega-
tive ethical models. 88 
The student sees that it is in court opinions that one 
finds the real world of the profession, and that world is not 
concerned with ethical issues. From the student's perspective 
it appears that only ivory tower academicians worry about 
such things. The real world of the legal profession does not 
have a pervasive approach to ethics. Courts which appear 
blind to ethical issues in their opinions can only reinforce the 
impression that ethical issues are not worth spotting-that a 
30. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1948). See also Elkins, 
supra note 19, at 742 ("mental categorization and classification"). 
31. A statistical analysis using a law student's perceptions of his education, al-
beit with somewhat different factors, comes to the same conclusion. "[T]he prevailing 
mode of instruction in fact socializes students into the belief that legal ethics are not 
important." Pipkin, supra note 14, at 274 (emphasis in original). 
32. The system shows them that good issue spotting equals good grades, which 
equals good jobs, which equals the good life-success. 
33. "To a large extent people behave as they are expected to behave and their 
expectations arise less from what they are told than from the examples they observe." 
Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261, 278 (1975). 
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lawyer will not be rewarded for dealing with them openly and 
honestly.84 The appellate opinion, the most meaningful model 
and professional identity maker, teaches that one deals with 
ethics only when forced to. That makes a mockery of what we 
are trying to communicate-that as professionals, ethics 
should pervade our thoughts and actions because that is one 
of the major factors which differentiates our profession from a 
business. 811 
Teaching ethics will never be done "well enough," yet the 
need to strive for this goal must still be nurtured. If we give 
up, we teach "contempt for ethical behavior .... [P]latitudes 
not only cannot overcome example, they turn the example 
into destructive hypocrisy."88 Although a change in how the 
bench approaches the ethical behavior of the profession will 
obviously not solve all-or everi most-of the problems of 
producing lawyers who behave ethically, it certainly must be a 
component of any movement toward solutions. 87 
III. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS 
Many studies have determined that a core problem of the 
structure of the legal profession's ethical-disciplinary system 
is the initiating mechanism for investigations of lawyers' con-
duct. 88 The three major sources of information, or the initia-
34. See generally E. FROMM, MAN FOR HIMSELF-AN INQUIRY INTO THE PSYCHOL· 
OGY OF ETHICS (1947). "Indeed, the fear of disapproval and the need for approval 
seem to be the most powerful and almost exclusive motivation for ethical judgment." 
/d. at 11. 
35. "In short, with respect to a capacity to distinguish in ethical matters, we 
may be fast losing our status as a profession and becoming nothing more than skilled 
merchant clerks." E. CAHN, CoNFRONTING INJUSTICE 257 (1962). See also note 104 
infra. 
36. J. LIBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 208 (1978). Chief Justice Burger's quotation 
at the beginning of this article-the pregnant illusion-makes the same point, supra 
note 1. 
37. Rosenhan, Moral Character, 27 STAN. L. REv. 925, 934-35 (1975). 
38. "Only after the identification function is improved are prosecutorial and ad-
judicatory procedures and policies of primary importance. Without adequate infor-
mation input, the system cannot attend to, because it does not know about, the ma-
jority of instances of lawyers' misconduct." Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and 
Professional Regulation, 1976 ABF REs. J. 917, 1005. See also ABA SPECIAL CoMMIT· 
TEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 168 (Final Draft, June 1970) (here-
inafter cited as CLARK REPORT); Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Compe· 
tence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEx. L. REv. 267, 282 (1979); Thode, The Duty of 
Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the 
Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 95. 
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tion of investigations, are (1) the public, usually a client, (2) 
the profession, or (3) a professional police force of some sort. 
The first source, the public, has been and will continue to be 
the major triggering mechanism in the disciplinary system. 
The deficiencies and gaps in this "de facto delegat[ion] to 
nonprofessionals"39 is well established. 
The source which, at least since the Clark Report, has re-
ceived the most attention has been some sort of professional 
policing force. 40 Having an omniscient and omnipotent police 
force would, of course, end most of our profession's ethical vi-
olations. If professional police were everywhere, very few law-
yers would violate the law. But this extreme remedy would 
have such a chilling effect on advocacy that our profession 
would lose its raison d'etre. Clearly the reforms and expan-
sion of the professional policing mechanism which the Clark 
Report seems to have set in motion have been beneficial with-
out approaching this totalitarian extreme. Movement in that 
direction is still needed and will be beneficial for both the 
profession and the public.41 Nevertheless, there must be a via-
ble and visible counterweight to slow the movement toward 
more and better policing. Without such a counterweight, the 
pressure from the public42 will push the expansion of the pro-
fessional police force to a point where there will be a signifi-
cant diminution of the profession's ability to be the zealous 
advocate and champion of the individual caught in the tenta-
cles of the legal system.43 
The only other source of a counterweight is from the pro-
fession itself, but reports by lawyers of other lawyers' ethical 
violations have been a very small percentage of the work of 
39. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 974. 
40. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 1005. 
41. For example, the work now being done on peer review with the emphasis on 
remedial rather than punitive action towards the lawyer. ALI-ABA CoMMITIEE ON 
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM-(Discussion 
Draft April 15, 1980). The medical profession is going through the same process. F. 
GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIAN'S LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE (1979). 
42. This pressure will most likely grow if for no other reason than that there is 
an increasing number of lawyers, law suits and areas into which litigation is reaching. 
With almost all lawsuits there will be losers, some of whom will transfer their disap-
pointment or anger to their lawyer. 
43. "[T]he bar increasingly will become the object of public scrutiny through 
nonjudicial, and thus more explicitly political, regulation." Wolfram, Barriers to Ef-
fective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 
619, 621 (1978). 
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disciplinary committees. 44 The reasons for ineffectiveness of 
the intraprofession reporting have been catalogued repeat-
edly. 411 All of the economic, social, and emotional pressures on 
lawyers militate against making accusations against other 
members of the bar. 
In our society the person who blows the whistle occupies 
a very ambiguous position.48 In common parlance and even in 
law review articles47 pejorative terms such as "squeal," "rat," 
"stool pigeon," and "gestapo" are used freely. People often 
say and believe · that such action somehow does violence to 
"basic ethical notions."48 As a parent one can remember using 
the devastating "put down" of, "Don't be a tattle-tale." On 
the other hand, we give and have been given messages such as, 
"Why didn't you tell me that Johnny was ... ?"48 Or think of 
press treatment of incidents where large numbers of people do 
nothing while some horrendous crime is unfolding before 
them. At best, our culture gives us very ambiguous guidance.110 
One must add to this general ambivalance the special 
pressures on a lawyer. The other lawyer is a colleague, and 
therefore one empathizes with him or her. There is also the 
real problem of the lawyer who is not a member of the "club": 
he also makes mistakes,111 he needs help and favors, and he 
has to work with these people.112 The Clark Report found 
"outright hostility" from the practicing bar toward discipli-
44. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38; Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within 
the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation? 1974 U. OF ILL. L.F. 193 (1974). 
45. See authorities cited in note 38 supra. See also McCracken, The Mainte-
nance of Professional Standards: Duty and Obligation of the Courts, 29 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 65 (1955). 
46. CALLAHAN & BoK, supra note 17, Chapter XI. 
47. See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 38; Note, The "Stool Pigeon" Canons: A 
Comment on Certain Sections of Canons 28 and 29 of the ABA Code of Ethics, 41 
CoNN. BAR J. 339 (1967). • 
48. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Report of New York City Re-
gional Hearings Before the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 66 
ABA J. 704 (1980) (Testimony of Professor Gray Thoron). 
49. CALLAHAN & BoK, supra note 17, at 289. Also relevant is the Biblical admo-
nition: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." John 8:7. 
50. V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980). 
51. "This factor of identifying the potential evil in oneself with the misbehavior 
of others is probably the single greatest factor that inhibits peer discipline." Watson, 
supra note 20, at 637 n.29. 
52. "[A] much stronger relationship was found between their needs for affilia-
tion and helpfulness and their tendency to cheat." Rosenhan, supra note 37, at 929. 
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nary enforcement.113 A lawyer who follows the ethical duty and 
reports instances of questionable conduct will be viewed with, 
if not hostility, at least suspicion and as a consequence the 
lawyer's practice may suffer. 
I have never heard of (or been able to find reported) a 
lawyer disciplined or even investigated for violating DR 1-
103(A): "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a vio-
lation of DR 1-102 [any other Disciplinary Rule] shall report 
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to 
investigate or act upon such violation."114 It is interesting to 
note that the present "Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct"1111 would weaken the language of the 
reporting requirement. The draft proposes that a lawyer only 
be required to report a violation if it is "substantial."116 It has 
been pointed out that "lawyers with their quibbling minds 
will always be able to rationalize a breach as less than sub-
stantial by some defensible theory."117 Even this emasculated 
reporting requirement, however, appears to be too much for a 
segment of the ABA, which wants the entire rule abandoned.118 
But this debate is as hypocritical as it is academic. In the past 
lawyers have not initiated significant numbers of complaints 
against their colleagues and there is no indication that they 
will do so in the future. 
If the bar does not function as the counterweight to the 
professional police force, then the only other segment of the 
profession which might fill the role is the bench. The Code of 
Judicial Conduct, 3B(3) provides that a judge has the respon-
sibility to initiative disciplinary measures against judges or 
lawyers for unprofessional conduct. Although there may be 
some question about the mandatory nature of the reporting 
requirement for judges,119 there is no ambiguity that the Code 
says it should be done. Yet the literature60 and my own survey 
of reported opinions indicate that judges are no more likely to 
53. CLARK REPORT, supra note 38. 
54. ABA MoDEL ConE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ConE oF JuDICIAL 
CoNDUCT DR 1-103(A)(1980). 
55. 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Supp. No. 32, 1980). 
56. /d. at 30. 
57. 49 U.S.L.W. 2126, 2127 (1980)(Testimony of Michael Franck). 
58. /d. 
59. Robinson, The Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 ARK. L. 
REv. 605, 608 n.13 (1980). 
60. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38. 
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report lawyer misconduct than are mere lawyers. 
The lack of judicial activity in reporting ethical violations 
has been the subject of some rather caustic criticism: 
The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompe-
tence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts. 
During the past several years, many judges, most notably 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, have complained that a 
significant number of advocates who appear before them 
are incompetent. Trial judges constantly swap stories 
about lawyers they had to rescue discreetly from a sinking 
case. Numerous courts have had to grapple with the seri-
ous question of whether to overturn a criminal conviction 
because the defendant had 'inadequate assistance of 
counsel' .... Yet neither the Chief Justice nor the other 
judges have forwarded the names of obviously unskilled 
and incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for 
appropriate action.81 
The standard explanation of this judicial inactivity paral-
lels that for lawyers in general.62 Judges are lawyers and are 
subject to the social and personal feelings for the members of 
their profession. Nevertheless, judges are different from law-
yers in ways which should mandate a more active role, or at 
least make the excuses less tenable. 
If judges are excused from their duty to initiate discipli-
nary actions because they were once lawyers, one could as eas-
ily throw out their function as impartial decision makers, 
since judges were all biased advocates prior to their "eleva-
tion." Our system requires that judges shed their role as advo-
cates upon taking the oath of judicial office. As in all human 
activities, some judges are more successful in being impartial 
than others. It is, however, expected both by the system and 
by the people within the system that judges will be impartial, 
and to some extent at least this is a self-fulfilling expectation. 
By becoming a judge a lawyer is expected to change. He or she 
is being paid to make decisions, often hard decisions, concern-
ing people and their actions. It certainly does not seem too 
much to expect that judges take their separation (elevation) 
from the bar seriously enough to be able to fulfill their duty to 
61. LIBERMAN, supra note 36, at 203-04. See also Aronson, Reforms Needed to 
Correct Malaise in Enforcement of Canons of Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1979 at 27, 
col. 1; FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 101 (1975). 
62. See, e.g., Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38. 
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report ethical violations. Until they do so, the lack of judicial 
action will be the highest level of hypocrisy in the entire self~ 
regulatory system. 
Other factors should also be considered to give judges 
greater obligations to initiate ethics complaints. A judge is a 
salaried employee of the government and thereby is not vul-
nerable by being excluded from the bar. This situation is 
clearly much different from a lawyer in private practice, espe-
cially outside of the large urban areas, whose business and 
financial well-being is to a significant extent dependent on not 
being a "pariah." 
The higher up in the judicial structure, the weaker are 
the pressures not to report. The appellate judge will have 
fewer official contacts with any one lawyer.83 On a less tangi-
ble level, there are factors of status and role which give the 
appellate judge a greater ability to act. Such judges regularly 
are called upon to make decisions that put them at odds with 
the judges below them. Logically, the hard and painful ques-
tions about individual lawyer's conduct should be one more 
step removed, and therefore somewhat easier. 
A final factor to be put in the balance on the side of judi-
cial activism in this area is the "inherent power doctrine." 
This judicially-created doctrine keeps the regulation of the le-
gal profession almost exclusively within the judicial branch of 
government.84 A judicial position that "we and only we have 
the power to regulate the legal profession, but that we, as in-
dividuals, will not do it because it is so unpleasant or not a 
proper function of a judge," is indefensible. 
A. Dangers of an Activist Judiciary 
If judges become more active in enforcing ethical rules 
there is a danger that advocacy before them will be compro-
mised. There are instances of courts, usually in league with 
others, using disciplinary procedures against lawyers who are 
representing unpopular clients and causes.811 If more judges 
63. An exception to this would be some government lawyers. 
64. Wolfram, supra note 43; Wajert v. State Ethics Comm., 420 A.2d 439 
(1980). "[This] Court declares that it has inherent and exclusive power to supervise 
the conduct of attorneys .... " 420 A.2d at 442 (quoting Pa.R.D.E. 103). 
65. Note, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1970). A suit by a well known Virginia civil rights attorney 
charging that State Bar officials used their disciplinary process to harass him was 
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saw their roles as ethical activists there would be a greater 
likelihood of blatant political use of the process. 
A general chilling of zealous advocacy before courts might 
also be a side effect of having lawyers know that both they 
and their clients are being "judged." In In Re Bithroney,66 
Judge Coffin discussed the dangers of inhibiting zealous advo-
cacy and the need for "breathing room for the fullest possible 
exercise of the advocacy function."87 He went on to state: 
Even at this point we might hesitate to take disciplinary 
action, sensitive to even the slightest possibility of casting 
an inhibitory shadow upon the ardor of those who prac-
tice before us. But even more serious [than filing appeals 
in bad faith] in our view was respondent's complete fail-
ure to diligently pursue prosecution of four of the 
appeals.88 
Nevertheless, no matter how sensitive courts are in enforcing 
ethical conduct, there will inevitably be actions which a law-
yer will not take, due to fear of having his or her ethics pub-
licly questioned. 
Another problem posed by an ethically-activist bench 
would be the greater danger of unfairly, if unintentionally, 
causing damage to an "innocent" lawyer.89 It is advocated in 
this article that judges, sua sponte, and explicitly in written 
opinions, state that what they have read in the record or actu-
ally seen before them in court is enough to warrant an investi-
gation. The court would then refer the matter to the appropri-
ate body to determine whether there has been a violation of 
an ethical mandate. This would be done without the matter 
settled and the officials admitted that they had engaged in "unfairness and procedu-
ral irregularities." Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 20, 1975, at A-1, col. 2. See also 
Greene v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n., 411 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Va. 1976), in which an 
activist Black lawyer found that the regional disciplinary committee had "an exten-
sive file ... on his activities ... apparently contain[ing] information on his profes-
sional and non-professional background." 411 F. Supp. at 517. 
66. 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973). 
67. /d. at 322. 
68. /d. at 323. The court's reasoning appears to be inconsistent. If the respon-
dent-lawyer had "diligently" pursued the frivolous appeals he would have com-
pounded his abuse of the system. The court, however, must have felt that it had to 
support its action with a statement about a lawyer's duty to his or her client and 
therefore reached out for this "zealous advocacy" basis for decision. 
69. "(The] dangers of whistleblowing: of uses in error or in malice; of work and 
reputations unjustly lost for those falsely accused; of privacy invaded, and trust un-
dermined." CALLAHAN & BoK, supra note 17, at 279. 
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having been presented to the court as an issue in the case, and 
the lawyer would not be given the opportunity to present his 
or her side.70 Obviously it will sometimes happen that what 
was in the record was not in fact correct or was ethically justi-
fiable when other factors are considered.71 In such cases an 
innocent lawyer will have had his or her reputation damaged 
by a court opinion questioning the propriety of an action.72 
Fairness to the accused person is a serious problem when-
ever the system has questions about a person's actions (e.g., 
investigation or indictment). Courts might mitigate possible 
damage through careful use of language in these opinions. 
Ironically, the fact that the accusations would be in appellate 
court opinions would probably lessen the damage to the law-
yer's reputation because of one of the factors which keeps law-
yers from turning in other lawyers-empathy. While reading 
the cases for this article I found myself thinking of all the 
possible things that would justify or excuse the conduct of the 
lawyer about whom I was reading. Generally, lawyers are the 
only people who regularly read appellate opinions and by 
their identification with the lawyer in the opinion, they are 
more inclined to take the accusations for what they are. 
The danger that a false accusation will be spread on the 
record is inherent in any open system of discipline. One has to 
weigh the possibility of damage to innocent lawyers against 
the benefits.78 Part of this process will depend on the weight 
one gives to the need to strengthen the enforcement system, 
which in turn depends on one's view of the degree of defi-
ciency of lawyers' ethics.74 Such an evaluation is not under-
taken in this article, but there seem to be grave and substan-
tial deficiencies. 
A question might also arise concerning the due process 
70. What is being suggested is merely the reporting-triggering mechanism, not 
the investigatory or adjudicatory procedures. 
71. "Justification plays such a large role in behavior that its openendedness cre-
ates serious difficulties for moral education." Rosenhan, supra note 37, at 930. 
72. In an analogous area, in making public the disciplinary/adjudicatory proce-
dure, the A.B.A. has recommended openness. There appears, however, to be very 
strong opposition because of "the specter of sensationalist newspaper publicity about 
a flimsy allegation of misconduct." Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 12, col. 3. 
73. With the admonitions about the appearance of impropriety in the Code, the 
number of "completely innocent" lawyers should be quite small. ABA CANONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9. 
74. Or how bad the public thinks it is. See notes 42 and 43 supra. 
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implications posed by a court which initiated the investiga-
tion and then sat in judgment on it. If the highest court of the 
state made the complaint the possibility exists that the same 
court might be required to review on appeal any disciplinary 
action. There would be a somewhat analogous situation when 
an attorney is convicted of a crime and an appeal is heard by 
the state's highest court and then that court is asked to review 
disciplinary action flowing from the conviction. Also, it is cer-
tainly not unusual for appellate courts to review cases, aspects 
of which they had reviewed and made decisions on before. 
Our notions of fundamental fairness71 would not be offended 
by an appellate court reviewing disciplinary action which re-
sulted from an investigation it had requested.78 
B. Effectiveness of Active Judicial Enforcement 
There clearly are dangers and costs to judicial activism in 
this area. The benefits to be derived from active judicial en-
forcement must be analyzed in order to make an informed de-
cision. The first part of this paper set out the benefits to the 
next generation of lawyers and their clients from an educa-
tional experience that is meaningful and real in terms of what 
will be expected of lawyers. Also, more immediate benefits will 
be derived for each of the three traditional functions of self-
regulation:77 (1) to identify and remove seriously deviant 
members of the bar (the cleansing function);78 (2) to deter 
75. See generally Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19 (1938). 
76. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently declared it a violation of 
due process for the same court to prosecute and judge an ethical violation. 
While as a legislator in the arena of bar ethics and discipline, this court 
can and does fashion, by rules, the necessary prosecutorial machinery, it 
cannot itself exercise enforcement powers for, or on behalf of, the in-
strumentality it has created .... An exercise of both functions would be 
inconsistent with this court's constitutionally-mandated responsibility 
for adjudication of bar disciplinary proceedings. 
Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n., 624 P.2d 1049, 1055 (1981). There is, of course, a 
significant difference between prosecuting ethical violations and merely reporting or 
initiating investigations. 
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, in a more apposite situation, reasoned dif-
ferently. Counsel moved for recusal of the judge in a case where the presiding judge 
had referred a matter to the disciplinary committee. The court held that: "(t)here is 
no basis for concluding that the prior incident affected the judge's ability to render 
impartial judgments." Commonwealth v. Cresta, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 560, 565, 336 
N.E.2d 910, 915 (1975). 
77. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 999. 
78. This category should be expanded to include a competency identification 
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other lawyers; and (3) to maintain enough action to forestall 
public intervention. 
First, the "cleansing" function of the disciplinary system 
would obviously be furthered by the removal of "deviant" 
lawyers whom the court identified and referred for investiga-
tion. It is undoubtedly true, however, that much seriously un-
ethical conduct never comes to the attention of any court (for 
example, those things that lawyers do for and to clients in the 
privacy of their offices). One might assume, however, that 
most of the lawyers whose unethical practices come to the no-
tice of a court are engaging in a substantial amount of evil in 
private. Therefore, if a court-initiated investigation eventually 
removes them from practice or forces them to change their 
ways, one would assume that both their overt and covert dam-
age will be ended. On a much larger scale (and in the long run 
probably much more beneficial) courts would be able to iden-
tify lawyers who need help to become competent practition-
ers, and could require individualized education and training 
for them. 
Second, the deterrence function 79 would clearly be en-
hanced in those cases which the lawyer knows will end up 
before a court.· In much of what lawyers do there is the possi-
bility that some part will end up before a court. Unethical 
conduct is more likely to be deterred if it is known and under-
stood by lawyers that conduct that looked unethical and 
comes to the notice of a judge will be automatically and 
openly referred for investigation. 
One quasi-deterrent effect would be in educating (or re-
educating) lawyers as to what is, in fact, unethical. The spe-
cific ethical rule would be articulated in the opinion. There-
fore, the fact that such conduct is accepted practice by 
lawyers in an area will not diminish the ethical standards for 
other lawyers in the area by "custom and usage." Court opin-
ions would bring to lawyers' consciousness the impropriety of 
the action and the knowledge that in the larger world of the 
and educational procedures aimed at remedying deficiencies in a lawyer's knowledge 
and/or skills. See, e.g., In re Edmondson, 518 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1975) (lawyer sus-
pended from practice before the court for six months and until the court is satisfied 
that he is familiar with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
79. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); 
Hughes, Should Alfie Be Let Off?, 27 N.Y. REv. OF BooKs No. 18 at 47 (Nov. 20, 
1980). 
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profession it will not be tolerated. 
Finally, the third function of our disciplinary system-to 
maintain enough action to forestall public interven-
tion-would be enhanced. This is essentially a public relations 
or image problem and an active bench would take away the 
charge of hypocrisy with which judges are so effectively at-
tacked. 80 By openly and honestly dealing with ethical ques-
tions, courts would have to have a salutory effect on the image 
of the entire legal profession. 
IV. How MIGHT A CHANGE CoME ABouT? 
There are reported cases in which courts, apparently on 
their own motion, publicly refer attorneys to ethics commit-
tees. A court will probably act if the situation is particularly 
egregious. In one case the Supreme Court of New Jersey di-
rected "that proceedings be had"81 against an attorney for 
neglect82 in a capital case which subjected his client to the 
danger of execution. The same attorney, the court added, had 
been disbarred and readmitted once before. There are a few 
other instances in which it appears courts acted out of petu-
lance or exasperation in referring lawyers to ethics commit-
tees.88 In these situations there is almost no residual deter-
rence or lesson except for the lawyer involved in the action 
(i.e., there is only a specific as opposed to a general deter-
rence). In the first type of case the lawyer's conduct is so out-
rageous that others will quickly put the decision out of their 
minds as an aberration. The second case could not deter or 
teach in a meaningful way since it does not set out the con-
duct and the ethical standard. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
appears to be the only court which has consistently published 
opinions with the names and deeds of attorneys who have 
been derelict in their ethical duties to their clients.84 It also 
80. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 61 supra. 
81. In re McDermit, 96 N.J.L. 17, 114 A. 144 (1921). 
82. !d. at 21, 114 A. at 146. The inference can be drawn that the attorney's 
action was more like extortion. He apparently was trying to get more money by hold-
ing up further work on the appeal. 
83. See, e.g., Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1964)(the case appears to 
have grown out of a messy domestic battle in which one of the lawyers was related to 
a party). 
84. See, e.g., In re Young, 537 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Morris, 521 F.2d 
794 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ferrara, 469 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Chan-
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appears from these opinions that the court is initiating the 
disciplinary proceedings, but these cases are criminal cases 
and it is possible that the United States Attorneys' Offices are 
the real moving parties. These opinions go back a number of 
years, and it would be valuable to design a study to determine 
whether there are measurable differences in either ethics or 
advocacy in that circuit compared to other circuits. 
A recent development is a formal announcement of the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas that it will publish the names of 
attorneys who "without good cause" miss a deadline for filing· 
an appeal, and that they will be referred to the Committee on 
Professional Conduct.811 One wonders what the disciplinary 
committee will do other than determine an appropriate sanc-
tion since the court will apparently have determined the lack 
of "good cause." Also, one wonders how the "good cause" is-
sue is to be decided? 
By contrast, the Second Circuit has stated: "The business 
of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a gen-
eral overseer of the ethics of those who practice here unless 
the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before 
it."86 There clearly appears to be a strong presumption in the 
minds of most judges against being active in ethical matters. 
This attitude most often manifests itself in a lack of comment 
or action in cases which presumptively include ethical issues 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel,87 legal malpractice,88 
or Rule 11 (honesty in pleading cases).89 Nevertheless, when 
one reads cases and articles with this question in mind, one 
finds explicit comments on how judges perceive their role. 
dler, 450 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971). 
85. Robinson, supra note 59. 
86. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Lawen-
schuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) where the Second Circuit affirmed 
disqualification of counsel who was also class representative in an antitrust suit, and 
where there was a "pattern of highly improper conduct ... making basefuss and un-
justified personal and professional attacks upon numerous reputable persons in the 
case." /d. at 20. Moreover, the court stated that "the Pennsylvania Bar Association is 
requested to review [the counsel's] conduct in this case, see Amer. Bar Ass'n. Code of 
Jud. Cond. Canon 3 8(3) and to take such action as is appropriate." /d. at 21. 
87. See, e.g., Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978); Schwartz, 
Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REv. 633 
(1980). 
88. See Schwartz supra note 87, cases cited at 648 n.67. 
89. See FED. R. C1v. PRoc. 11. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforce-
ment: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. 
L. REV. 1 (1976). 
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For example, in Quality Molding Co. v. American Na-
tional Fire Ins. Co.,90 the court had to make a decision as to 
what to do with a 'serious misquotation in a brief. Opposing 
counsel stated that the same misquotation had been made in 
the district court and that it had been specifically called to 
counsel's attention in the trial brief. The court concluded: 
"[A] deliberate misquotation calls for strong condemnation. 
However, we do not initiate disciplinary action in this court 
because there is a bare possibility that the fact that counsel's 
quotation was not correct might not have come to the per-
sonal attention of the attorney preparing the brief in this 
court .... "91 This sets the appropriate procedure on its head. 
One needs proof beyond a reasonable doubt----"bare possibil-
ity" -before one initiates an action. 
In a volume devoted to the teaching of ethics in law 
schools, a United States district court judge implied that such 
misquotation is not uncommon: "On several occasions my law 
clerks and I have had conferences about certain lawyers and 
their use of misquotations from opinions. Sometimes quota-
tions are manufactured. It's hard to give fair consideration to 
briefs from such lawyers the next time around. "91 It appears 
that to this judge the issue is not ethics, but mere credibility. 
Any movement in this area will have to come about 
through changes in individual judges' perceptions of their 
role. 93 Changing how a powerful and insular group of people 
perceive their job, after they have been trained and have per-
formed on the job in a different way, is a long-term proposi-
tion. One sensible place to begin would be at the top. The 
Supreme Court's opinions are the primary written source of 
teaching and learning in the legal profession, both during and 
after law school. Also, one would assume that the Justices are 
judicial role models. 94 
Although the present Chief Justice's speeches might sug-
gest otherwise, it seems clear that the Court does not see itself 
as having a significant role to play in this area. Take for ex-
90. 287 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1961). 
91. /d. at 316 (emphasis added). 
92. P. KEENAN, TEACHING PROF. RESP., MATERIALS & PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE 9-10 (1979). 
93. Legislative or executive action would be nullified by the "inherent powers" 
doctrine. See note 64 supra. 
94. See Watson supra note 22. 
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ample the recent case of Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.90 
The question presented to the Court was whether attorney's 
fees could be assessed against the plaintiffs' attorneys person-
ally, pursuant to certain statutes.98 The opinion catalogues the 
lawyers' abuse of the judicial process. The list goes from "un-
cooperative behavior"97 and "deliberate inaction"98 to their 
having "improvidently enlarged and inadequately prose-
cuted"99 the action. From the description of the lawyers' con-
duct the inevitable conclusion is that a prima facie case had 
been made that various disciplinary rules had been violated.100 
Yet not one word about ethics appears in the opinion.101 The 
entire discussion is in terms of money-who should bear the 
costs of the presumptively unethical conduct.102 When the Su-
preme Court's perception of ethical violations is solely in 
terms of dollars and cents one can hardly expect lawyers (and 
law students) to see themselves in a "profession" as opposed 
to a mere business. 108 
95. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). The only reference I have found to this case starts off 
with a statement implying that the Court was too concerned with matters of "compe-
tence and the abuse of judicial processes." 
It is a remarkable commentary on the level of rhetoric in the continuing 
debate over lawyer competence and the abuse of judicial processes that 
the U.S. Supreme Court can find itself blandly citing Charles Dickens' 
Bleak House for the proposition that "[d]ue to sloth, inattention, or de-
sire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long indulged in dilatory 
practices." 
Sinclair, Dilatory Behavior of Counsel: Roadway's Warning on Liability, Nat'l L.J., 
Aug. 11, 1980, at 19, col. 1. 
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) (allowing a court to tax excess costs incurred when a 
lawyer unreasonably and vexatiously increases costs); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000 e-5 (k) 
(Supp. II 1978) (allowing recovery of attorney fees as a part of the costs of litigation). 
97. 447 U.S. at 754. 
98. ld. at 755. 
99. ld. at 756. 
100. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINARY RuLE 1-102 (miscon-
duct); DISCIPLINARY RULE 6-101 (failure to act competently); DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101 
(failure to represent client zealously). 
101. Nor is there a mention of ethics in the opinions of the courts below. Monk 
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D.La. 1977), atf'd 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 
1979). Nor from what I have been able to find has any disciplinary investigation or 
action been taken. Letter on file. 
102. Even this discussion seems rather short-sighted. If the attorneys have to 
pay, it may be a deductible business expense and the public ends up paying. 
103. In one sense there is an unhealthy elitism in the use of the profession ver-
sus trade example. "[T]he belief that lawyers are somehow above trade has become 
an anachronism." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977). It is, 
however, inherent in the concept of self-regulation. The pursuit of profit is not the 
only motivating factor (and at least arguably not the primary factor) in the individual 
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If the Supreme Court started the process of openly com-
menting on ethical issues inherent in their cases, other courts 
would follow. Without leadership or a role model there will be 
no movement. 10' 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of 
our profession's ethical standards is but one scene, it affects 
the entire play. The judge's ethical code says that judges 
should be active, but that mandate is ignored. This sets the 
stage for the hypocrisy of the entire production. If self-regula-
tion is to be viable and believable, both to the public and to 
the players themselves, there must be some minimum level of 
honesty and commitment. 
There will be difficult cases where it is questionable 
whether a referral to the disciplinary system should be made. 
There will probably be an even greater number of cases where 
no mention of ethical problems should be made in the pub-
lished opinion, even if a referral is made. But surely there are 
cases where both the educational and deterrent values are 
paramount. "The answer perhaps is that courts of justice 
ought not to be puzzled by such old scholastic questions as to 
where a horse's tail begins and where it ceases. You are 
obliged to say, 'This is a horse's tail' at some time."1011 
lawyer's work. If there is no validity to "the delicate balance between need to earn a 
living and his obligation selflessly to serve," id. at 368, then the entire ethical system 
is merely a mask to hide the pursuit of the profession's economic self-interest. 
104. Alternatively, the political pressures may become so great that the entire 
structure of the legal profession is changed radically as, for example, it was during the 
Jacksonian Era. C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911). 
105. Lavery v. Pursell, 39 Ch. D. 508 (1888). 
